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I. ABSTRACT
Copyright and charity law are generally considered distinct and
unrelated bodies of law. But they are actually quite similar and complement
each other.' Both copyright and charity law are intended to increase social
welfare by solving market and government failures in public goods caused
by free riding.2 Copyright solves market and government failures in works
of authorship by providing an indirect subsidy to marginal authors, and
charity law solves market and government failures in charitable goods by
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky School of Law. J.D.,
New York University School of Law, 2005; M.F.A., San Francisco Art Institute, 1997; B.A,
University of California, Berkeley, 1995. The author thanks Dean Jon Garon and the 2015
Nova Law Review Symposium, New Media and Old Metaphors. The author also thanks
Johnny Schmidt for helpful observations on the relationship between copyright and charity.
I. See infra Part IV.
2. See infra Part IV.A-B.
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providing an indirect subsidy to marginal donors. Copyright and charity
law complement each other by solving market and government failures in
works of authorship in different ways.4 Copyright solves market and
government failures in works of authorship by reducing ex ante transaction
costs, but it increases ex post transaction costs.' Charity solves market and
government failures in works of authorship by reducing both ex ante and ex
post transaction costs. 6  Accordingly, the efficient scope and duration of
copyright should reflect ex ante transaction costs, because charity can more
efficiently reduce ex post transaction costs.
II. INTRODUCTION
As George Lakoff and Mark Johnson observed, "[t]he essence of
metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of
another."7 In other words, metaphors express analogies.8 For better or
worse, legal reasoning depends on analogies. 9 Lawyers argue cases by
comparing them to other cases, and judges decide cases by comparing them
to previously decided cases.10  Both assume that similar cases should
generally produce similar results and dissimilar cases should generally
produce dissimilar results." If it was negligent for a defendant to perform a
particular act in a particular circumstance, we assume that it is negligent to
perform similar acts in similar circumstances, but do not assume that it is
negligent to perform different acts in different circumstances. 12
Analogical reasoning consists in determining when similarities and
differences are relevant, and when they are not.13 Scholars disagree about
3. See infra Part IV.C.
4. See infra Part V.C.
5. See infra Part V.A.
6. See infra Part V.B.
7. GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 5 (1980)
(emphasis omitted).
8. Dedre Gentner et al., Metaphor is Like Analogy, in THE ANALOGICAL
MIND: PERSPECTIVES FROM COGNITIVE SCIENCE 199, 199 (Dedre Gentner et al., eds., 2001).
9. Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 741, 741 (1993) ("Reasoning by analogy is the most familiar form of legal reasoning. It
dominates the first year of law school; it is a characteristic part of brief-writing and opinion-
writing as well.").
10. Id. at 741, 745-48.
11. Id. at 745-46.
12. See id.
13. Id. at 745.
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the merits of analogical reasoning in law.1 4 Critics argue that it obscures the
general theories that should determine the outcome of cases.1 5 But advocates
argue that it can reveal the weaknesses of general theories by recognizing the
contingent and circumstantial values that they ignore.16
But what if analogical reasoning were used to compare general
theories of law, rather than particular cases?' 7 Perhaps it could help identify
relationships between theories that would otherwise be obscured, and thereby
improve our understanding of those theories and how they apply in
practice.
This Article argues that comparing the prevailing theories of
copyright and charity law reveals that they are strikingly similar and
complementary bodies of law. 19 Copyright and charity law are both intended
to increase social welfare by solving market failures in public goods caused
by free riding.20 But they do so by reducing different kinds of transaction
costs. 2 1 It follows that each should be designed to focus on the transaction
costs it is best suited to address. 22
III. WELFARE & COPYRIGHT
In his provocative article Author's Welfare: Copyright as a
Statutory Mechanism for Redistributing Rights, Tom Bell argues that welfare
and copyright are similar because both are statutory entitlements intended to
increase social welfare by redistributing personal property rights from
members of the general public to particular beneficiaries: "Welfare aims to
improve social well-being by helping the poor, whereas copyright aims to
improve social well-being by helping those who create expressive works." 23
Welfare redistributes wealth from taxpayers to the poor, and provides the
benefit of reducing poverty, at the cost of discouraging work.24 Copyright
14. LLOYD L. WEINREB, LEGAL REASON: THE USE OF ANALOGY IN LEGAL
ARGUMENT 67 (2005).
15. E.g., Richard A. Posner, Reasoning by Analogy, 91 CORNELL L. REv. 761,
765 (2006) (book review).
16. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 9, at 745.
17. See id. at 776-77.
18. See Posner, supra note 15, at 765.
19. See infra Part IV.
20. See infra Part IV.A-B.
21. See infra Part V.A-B.
22. See infra Part V.C.
23. Tom W. Bell, Author's Welfare: Copyright as a Statutory Mechanism for
Redistributing Rights, 69 BROOK. L. REv. 229, 236 (2003).
24. See id. at 231 n.1.
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redistributes rights from the public to authors, and provides the benefit of
increasing the supply of expressive works, at the cost of limiting their use.2 5
More controversially, Bell argues that the success of welfare reform
suggests the potential for successful copyright reform.26 Welfare reform
reduced the subsidy provided to the poor by limiting the availability of
welfare, and Bell claims that it was successful because it encouraged work
without increasing poverty.27 Based on the success of welfare reform, Bell
argues that copyright reform limiting the scope of copyright would increase
the use of expressive works, without reducing their supply. 2 8
Of course, there are weaknesses in Bell's argument. 29 To begin with,
many people disagree with his assertion that welfare reform was successful,
or that it encouraged work without increasing poverty.30 If welfare reform
was not successful, perhaps copyright reform would also not be successful.
More fundamentally, Bell's comparison of welfare and copyright is
strained, because they are not as similar as he suggests.3 1 Bell himself
admits that the analogy is not perfect, because copyright "looks a lot more
like property than welfare does." 32 Specifically, copyright provides rights to
exclude, but welfare only provides a right to due process. 3 3 He argues that
his analogy still holds, because welfare and copyright are both statutory
entitlements, not property rights.34
But Bell ignores other differences between welfare and copyright
which are fatal to his analogy. First, welfare provides a direct subsidy to the
poor, but copyright provides an indirect subsidy to authors. As a result, the
burden of welfare falls on the government, but the burden of copyright falls
on consumers of works of authorship. Second, welfare is vulnerable to
25. Id. at 245.
26. Id. at 277.
27. Id. at 236; Peter Edelman, Professor of Law, Poverty & Welfare: Does
Compassionate Conservatism Have a Heart?, Edward C. Sobota Memorial Lecture Series
(2001), in 64 ALB. L. REV. 1073, 1075 (2001). Specifically, Bell refers to The Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act. Bell, supra note 23, at 231 n.1.
28. See Bell, supra note 23, at 236; Tom. W. Bell, Escape from Copyright:
Market Success vs. Statutory Failure in the Protection of Expressive Works, 69 U. CIN. L.
REV. 741, 744, 746 (2001).
29. See Edelman, supra note 27, at 1074-76, 1078-79.
30. See, e.g., id. at 1074-76, 1078-79.
31. See id. at 255.
32. Id.
33. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (providing exclusive rights in
copyrighted works), with Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261-62 (1970) (holding that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires an evidentiary hearing before the
termination of welfare benefits).
34. Bell, supra note 23, at 273-74.
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government failures caused by majoritarian politics, but copyright is
vulnerable to government failures caused by rent-seeking. Third, welfare is
intended to increase static efficiency by improving the allocation of wealth,
but copyright is intended to increase dynamic efficiency by encouraging the
creation of works of authorship. And fourth, welfare is a common-pool
resource because it is rivalrous, but works of authorship are public goods
because they are non-rivalrous.
While the differences between welfare and copyright render Bell's
conclusions unconvincing, the analogy that he draws between welfare and
copyright still improved our understanding of copyright by showing that it is
best understood as a form of statutory entitlement, rather than a form of
physical property.35 It follows that the scope and duration of copyright
protection ought to be determined in relation to other statutory entitlements,
rather than in relation to physical property. 36 Moreover, even the limited
success of Bell's analogy suggests that alternative analogies may further
improve our understanding of copyright.3 7 Specifically, this Article argues
that comparing copyright and charity law can improve our understanding of
both areas of law, and show how they complement each other.
IV. COPYRIGHT & CHARITY LAW
The prevailing theories of both copyright and charity law are
economic subsidy theories, which hold that copyright and charity law are
justified because they increase social welfare by solving market and
government failures caused by free riding.3 8 This formal similarity of the
respective theories of copyright and charity law is reinforced by a substantive
similarity in their purpose. 39 The purpose of copyright is to increase public
welfare by solving market failures in works of authorship, which are a
particular form of public good, and the purpose of charity law is to increase
public welfare by solving market failures in charitable goods, which include
35. Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83
TEX. L. REv. 1031, 1032 (2005). "If we must fall back on a physical-world analogy for
intellectual property protection-and I see no reason why we should-treating intellectual
property as a form of government subsidy is more likely to get people to understand the
tradeoffs involved than treating it as real property." Id. at 1032 n.2 (stating "Tom Bell is the
first to draw this analogy, likening copyright specifically to a particular form of government
subsidy: [W]elfare").
36. See id. at 1069-71.
37. See id. at 1032.
38. Brian L. Frye, Solving Charity Failures, 93 OR. L. REv. 155, 159-60
(2014).
39. See id. at 168.
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a broad range of public and quasi-public goods, including works of
authorship.4 0 In other words, works of authorship are a category of
charitable goods, and copyright is arguably a category of charity law, or
41
rather, the continuation of charity by other means.
A. The Economic Subsidy Theory of Copyright
The economic subsidy theory of copyright holds that it is justified
because it solves market and government failures in works of authorship
caused by free riding.42 Works of authorship are non-rivalrous-or public
goods-because the consumption of a work of authorship does not affect the
supply. 4 3 Classical economics predicts that free riding will cause market
failures in public goods, because rational economic actors will consume the
good without paying the marginal cost of production."
Copyright solves market failures in works of authorship by making
them excludable and thereby enabling authors to recover their fixed costs and
opportunity costs. 4 5 In other words, copyright indirectly subsidizes authors
by giving them certain exclusive rights to use works of authorship for a
certain period of time.4 6 As a result, authors can internalize some of the
positive externalities or spillovers generated by the creation of a work of
authorship by charging consumers more than the marginal cost of
production.4 7 Essentially, copyright provides an incentive for marginal
authors to invest in the production of works of authorship.4 8
Of course, direct subsidies can also solve market failures in works of
authorship caused by free riding.49 For example, governments directly
subsidize the production of works of authorship by distributing grants to
authors.50 But these direct subsidies are vulnerable to government failures
caused by rent-seeking and transaction costs, especially information costs.s"
40. See id. at 166.
41. Cf CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 87 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret
eds., trans., 1976) ("War Is Merely the Continuation of [Politics] by Other Means").
42. Frye, supra note 38, at 159-160; see also RONALD A. CASS & KEITH N.
HYLTON, LAWS OF CREATION: PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WORLD OF IDEAS 141 (2013).
43. See Frye, supra note 38, at 163; Lemley, supra note 35, at 1054.
44. Frye, supra note 38, at 164.
45. See Lemley, supra note 35, at 1054.
46. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 302 (2012).
47. Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV.
257, 268 (2007).
48. Id. at 283-84.
49. See Frye, supra note 38, at 164.
50. See Lemley, supra note 35, at 1063.
51. See id.
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Public choice theory predicts that rent-seeking will cause governments to
distribute grants inefficiently, and classical economics predicts that
information costs and other transaction costs will prevent governments from
distributing grants efficiently.52 In others words, governments cannot know
which authors to subsidize, and politics creates incentives to subsidize the
wrong authors.5 3
Copyright solves government failures in works of authorship by
reducing certain forms of rent-seeking and transaction costs. 5 4 Copyright
reduces ex ante rent-seeking by subsidizing all authors in relation to the
economic value of their work of authorship." Copyright also reduces ex
ante transaction costs by enabling marginal authors to decide whether the
private cost of investing in authorship is smaller than the private benefit
provided by copyright.5 6  Presumably, individual authors can gather and
assess relevant information more efficiently than governments.5 7
B. The Economic Subsidy Theory of Charity
The economic subsidy theory of charity law holds that it "is justified
because it solves market . . . and government failures in charitable goods"
caused by free riding. Charitable goods resemble public goods because
they are either actually or ideally non-rivalrous. 9 For example, religion is
actually non-rivalrous because the consumption of religion does not affect
the supply; food banks are ideally non-rivalrous because they are intended to
provide food to all who require it.60 Accordingly, "[c]lassical economics
predicts that free riding will cause market failures in [charitable] goods." 6 1
Charity law solves market failures in charitable goods by enabling
certain donors to deduct certain charitable contributions from their income
tax base, thereby compensating for free riding on charitable contributions by
indirectly subsidizing altruism. 6 2  In other words, charity law indirectly
subsidizes the production of charitable goods by reducing the cost of
52. See Frye, supra note 38, at 164-65; Lemley, supra note 35, at 1065.
53. See Frye, supra note 38, at 164-65.
54. See Lemley, supra note 35, at 1063-64.
55. See Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 47, at 268.
56. See id.; Frye, supra note 38, at 164.
57. See Frye, supra note 38, at 164.
58. Id. at 158-59; see also JOHN D. COLOMBO & MARK A. HALL, THE
CHARITABLE TAX EXEMPTION 109, 113 (1995).
59. Frye, supra note 38, at 163, 165.
60. See id. at 163-65.
61. Id. at 163.
62. Id. at 166-67.
2015] 349
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altruism. 6 3 Essentially, charity law provides an incentive for marginal donors
to invest in the production of charitable goods, thereby generating positive
externalities.6
Of course, direct subsidies can also solve market failures in
charitable goods caused by free riding.65 Governments can and do directly
subsidize the production of charitable goods by distributing grants to
charities.66 But these direct subsidies are vulnerable to market failures
caused by rent-seeking and transaction costs. 6 7 Public choice theory predicts
that rent-seeking will cause governments to distribute grants inefficiently,
and classical economics predicts that information costs and other transaction
costs will prevent governments from distributing grants efficiently.68 In
others words, governments cannot know which charities to subsidize, and
- - * *69politics creates incentives to subsidize the wrong charities.
Charity law solves government failures in charitable goods by
reducing certain forms of rent-seeking and transaction costs. 70 Charity law
reduces rent-seeking and transaction costs by subsidizing altruism,
depending on donors to identify worthy charities. Presumably, individual
donors can gather and assess relevant information more efficiently than
governments.
C. Comparing Copyright & Charity Law
The structural similarity of the economic subsidy theories of
copyright and charity law is obvious.72 Both hold that indirect subsidies are
justified because they solve market and government failures in a public good
and thereby increase social welfare.7 3  Copyright is justified because it
increases social welfare by providing an incentive to create works of
authorship, and charity law is justified because it increases social welfare by
providing an incentive to make charitable contributions. 74
63. See id.
64. See Frye, supra note 38, at 168, 171.
65. Id. at 167.
66. Id. at 177.
67. Id. at 177-78.
68. See id. at 164-65, 177-78.
69. See Frye, supra note 38, at 164-65, 177-78.
70. Id. at 166-67.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 166.
73. Id.
74. Frye, supra note 38, at 162.
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The economic subsidy theories of copyright and charity law are
welfarist theories, which hold that copyright and charity law are justified
because they are efficient. In other words, copyright and charity law are
justified because their social benefit is larger than their social cost, so they
actually increase social welfare. It follows that the justification of both
copyright and charity law depends on a testable hypothesis." According to
the economic subsidy theory, copyright is justified because the social benefit
of increasing the production of works of authorship is actually larger than the
social cost of increasing the scope or duration of copyright protection, and
charity law is justified because the social benefit of increasing the production
of charitable goods is larger than the social cost of reduced tax revenue. Or
rather, copyright and charity law are justified because they increase social
welfare on the margins. 79  But that hypothesis is inconsistent with the
doctrine and development of both copyright and charity law.o
D. The Justification for Copyright
Copyright doctrine is inconsistent with its welfarist justification
because the scope and duration of copyright protection is uniform for all
works of authorship, even though the efficient scope and duration of
copyright protection necessarily depend on the circumstances. 8 Each work
of authorship necessarily has unique fixed costs of production, and each
author necessarily has unique opportunity costs. 82 Moreover, some authors
may choose to invest in the production of works of authorship even if they
cannot recover their fixed and opportunity costs.83 In theory, the scope and
duration of copyright protection should vary from author to author and from
work to work.
Of course, it is practically impossible to tailor the scope and duration
of copyright protection to particular authors and works. But the scope and
duration of copyright protection does not even vary among categories of
works with manifestly different fixed and opportunity costs. 84  As Brad
Greenberg has memorably observed, Copyright protection under the 1976
75. Id. at 168.
76. Id. at 162.
77. Id. at 158, 172.
78. Id. at 162.
79. Frye, supra note 38, at 166-67.
80. Id. at 168.
81. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 302 (2012); Bell, supra note 23, at 277.
82. See Lemley, supra note 35, at 1032.
83. See id. at 1050.
84. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 302.
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85Act is like an Oprah giveaway: Everybody gets one. An email, a novel, a
home video, and a feature film all receive copyright protection of the same
scope and duration.86
In addition, the actual scope and duration of copyright protection
were not determined in relation to its ostensible welfarist justification.
Congress did not seriously consider marginal efficiency when it determined
the scope and duration of copyright protection. 8 And courts explicitly
refrain from considering the marginal efficiency of copyright protection
when reviewing its legitimacy.89
Moreover, the economic subsidy theory assumes that copyright is
justified because authors are rational economic actors, and marginal authors
will decide whether to invest in creating works of authorship based on
whether they can expect to recover their costs.90 But in practice, many
authors are not exclusively rational economic actors, and choose to invest in
the production of works of authorship even if they do not expect to recover
their costs.9 ' In fact, because copyright automatically protects even the most
trivial works of expression, copyright protection is not a salient incentive to
the overwhelming majority of authors who receive copyright protection.9 2
For example, copyright protects emails and snapshots, but does not provide a
salient incentive to produce those works of authorship.93 The economic
theory holds that copyright is justified because it increases social welfare; so
to the extent that copyright protection is not a salient incentive, it is not
justified.9 4
85. Brad A. Greenberg, Copyright and Trademark Troll: Fable or Fact?, held
by Chapman University School of Law, Law Review Symposium (Jan. 30, 2015) (Audio
Recording 19:34-19:53), available at
http://ibc.chapman.edu/Mediasite/Play/5fee649a60414522a5aIcl627f222ff8ld.
86. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 302.
87. See id. §§ 106, 302; Bell, supra note 23, at 277.
88. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 302; Bell, supra note 23, at 277.
89. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 208 (2003) ("In sum, we find
that the CTEA is a rational enactment; we are not at liberty to second-guess congressional
determinations and policy judgments of this order, however debatable or arguably unwise they
may be.").
90. See MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL
MONOPOLY 24-25 (2008).
91. See id.
92. See 17 U.S.C. § 106; Bell, supra note 23, at 242.
93. See 17 U.S.C. § 106.
94. BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 90, at 5-6.
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E. The Justification for Charity Law
Charity law doctrine is also inconsistent with its welfarist
justification because the indirect subsidy provided by the charitable
contribution deduction is unrelated to the market and government failures
that it ostensibly solves.95 The charitable contribution deduction indirectly
subsidizes the production of charitable goods by allowing certain donors to
deduct certain charitable contributions from their income tax base. As a
consequence, the higher the marginal income tax rate on the donor, the larger
the subsidy, and the lower the marginal income tax rate on the donor, the
smaller the subsidy. But there is no relationship between a donor's
marginal income tax rate and the market and government failures associated
with the recipient of that donor's charitable contribution.98 If anything, they
may be negatively correlated.99
In addition, the charitable contribution deduction is a salient
incentive to only a small minority of donors. Taxpayers can claim charitable
contribution deductions only if they itemize their deductions, but only about
thirty percent of taxpayers itemize their deductions.100 As a result, the
charitable contribution deduction is not a salient incentive for the seventy
percent of taxpayers who do not itemize their deductions, and is a
considerably less salient incentive for low-income taxpayers than it is for
high-income taxpayers.10 1
Moreover, the economic subsidy theory assumes that charity law is
justified because donors are rational economic actors, and marginal donors
will decide whether to make charitable contributions based on whether they
will receive a deduction.1 02 But in practice, many donors are not exclusively
rational economic actors, and choose to make charitable contributions even
though they do not expect to receive a deduction. 0 3 The economic subsidy
95. Frye, supra note 38, at 159-60.
96. Id. at 159.
97. Id. at 169.
98. See id. at 168.
99. See id.
100. BENJAMIN H. HARRIS & DANIEL BANEMAN, TAX POLICY CTR., WHO
ITEMIZES DEDUCTIONS? 345 (2011), available at http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/
UploadedPDF/ 1001 486-Who-Itemizes-Deductions.pdf.
101. But see Lilian V. Faulhaber, The Hidden Limits of the Charitable
Deduction: An Introduction to Hypersalience, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1307, 1310, 1325-26, 1327
n.93 (2012) (arguing that the charitable contribution deduction may be "hypersalient" to
certain taxpayers who mistakenly believe they can claim a deduction).
102. DAVID CHEAL, THE GIFT EcoNoMY 15 (1988); Frye, supra note 38, at 158.
103. See Frye, supra note 38, at 166, 182.
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theory holds that charity law is justified because it increases social welfare,
so to the extent that the charitable contribution deduction is not a salient
incentive to a particular donor, it is not justified. 104
V. COPYRIGHT AS CHARITY
While the premises of the economic subsidy theories of copyright
and charity law are inconsistent with copyright and charity law doctrine,
their structural similarities illuminate their complementary relationship.'05
The purpose of copyright is to increase public welfare by providing an
incentive for marginal authors to invest in the production of works of
authorship, and the purpose of charity law is to increase public welfare by
providing an incentive for marginal donors to invest in the production of
charitable goods.1 06
Essentially, works of authorship are a category of charitable
goods.1 07 Works of authorship and charitable goods both increase public
welfare by providing a public good. 08 In fact, charity law provides that
subsidizing the production and distribution of works of authorship is a
charitable purpose.' 09
It follows that copyright and charity law ought to be evaluated in
relation to one another. Under the economic subsidy theories of copyright
and charity law, indirect subsidies are justified to the extent that they are
efficient. If copyright is intended to increase public welfare by providing an
incentive for marginal authors to invest in the production of works of
authorship, copyright is justified only to the extent that it is more efficient
than charity law at providing incentives for marginal authors to invest in
charitable goods.
A. Copyright & Efficiency
Copyright efficiently reduces ex ante transaction costs that cause
market failures in works of authorship by devolving the decision-whether
to invest in the production of works of authorship-onto marginal authors,
who are generally in the best position to determine whether investing in a
104. See id.
105. Id. at 159.
106. See Bell, supra note 23, at 236.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See id.; Frye, supra note 38, at 168.
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work of authorship is likely to increase social welfare." 0  Moreover,
copyright forces authors to assume the risk of their investment by providing
a subsidy only if an author actually produces a work of authorship with
social value. Accordingly, copyright is generally highly efficient to the
extent that it enables authors to recover the fixed and opportunity costs of
investing in the production of works of authorship."' While many authors
would choose to invest in the production of works of authorship whether or
not they received a subsidy, copyright presumably provides at least a
marginal incentive to authors who contemplate investing more than a
nominal amount of resources in producing a work of authorship." 2
However, copyright is inefficient to the extent that it provides a
subsidy in excess of the fixed and opportunity costs of investing in the
production of works of authorship, not only because those subsidies do not
provide a marginal incentive, but also because they increase transaction
costs.' 13 To the extent that authors are rational economic actors, a subsidy
that exceeds the fixed and opportunity costs of investing in works of
authorship is inefficient; it provides an incentive to overinvest in the
production of works of authorship. The purpose of copyright is to encourage
authors to invest in the production of works of authorship that will increase
social welfare.1 4 Increasing the subsidy to works of authorship provides an
incentive to invest in the production of works of authorship even if they will
not increase social welfare.
In addition, copyright increases ex post transaction costs by
increasing the cost of consuming a work of authorship and increasing
information costs relating to the use of that work of authorship."'
Transaction costs imposed by copyright protection are justified to the extent
that they are offset by increases in public welfare. But copyright protection in
excess of what is required to provide an efficient incentive to marginal
authors is not justified because it creates transaction costs that are not offset
by increases in public welfare.1 6 In other words, copyright protection that
does not provide an efficient incentive to marginal authors provides a private
110. BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 90, at 23-25; Bell, supra note 23, at 267,
267 n.212
111. See BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 90, at 24-25; Bell, supra note 23, at
267 n.212, 267-68.
112. See Bell, supra note 23, at 236, 267 n.212, 267-68.
113. See Lemley, supra note 35, at 1032.
114. Bell, supra note 23, at 236, 238.
115. See id. at 277-78, 278 n.261.
116. See id.
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benefit without generating a corresponding public benefit, and reduces public
welfare." 7
To make matters worse, public choice theory predicts that copyright
is vulnerable to rent-seeking because authors have a strong incentive to lobby
the government to increase the scope and duration of copyright protection,
irrespective of its efficiency." 8 In particular, owners of valuable copyrights
have an incentive to invest in lobbying the government to increase the value
of those copyrights."19
B. Charity Law & Efficiency
Charity law efficiently reduces transaction costs that cause market
failures in charitable goods by devolving the decision-whether to invest in
the production of charitable goods-onto marginal donors, who are often in
good position to determine whether investing in the production of a
charitable good is likely to increase social welfare.1 20 Specifically, donors
are reasonably well-positioned to determine whether investing in the
production of a work of authorship is likely to increase public welfare.121 If
altruism motivates a donor to make a charitable contribution to the
production of a work of authorship, it is likely that the production of that
work of authorship will increase social welfare, and is thereby likely that any
indirect subsidy provided by the government will be efficient.1 22 In addition,
if altruism motivates a donor to make a charitable contribution to the
distribution of a work of authorship or the support of an author, it is likely
that the contribution will increase social welfare by enabling that author to
produce additional works of authorship, and is thereby likely that any
indirect subsidy provided by the government will also be efficient. 2 1
C. Comparing the Efficiency of Copyright & Charity Law
While copyright efficiently reduces ex ante transaction costs relating
to investments in the production of charitable goods, it increases ex post
117. See id.
118. See BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 90, at 261, 264-65; Lemley, supra
note 35, at 1063.
119. Lemley, supra note 35, at 1063-64.
120. See Frye, supra note 38, at 162, 167-68, 171.
121. Id. at 174.
122. See id. at 166, 171.
123. See id.
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transaction costs.124 By contrast, charity law reduces both ex ante and ex
post costs. 12 5 Copyright reduces ex ante transaction costs more efficiently
than charity law, because authors are generally in a better position than
donors to determine whether investing in a work of authorship will increase
social welfare.1 26  But copyright increases ex post transaction costs by
granting windfalls to authors and creating opportunities for rent-seeking,
while charity law is associated with low ex post transaction costs, because it
depends on altruism.1 27
It follows that copyright should focus on providing ex ante
incentives to marginal authors, and rely on charity law or its analogues to
provide any additional subsidies to authors. Charity law is especially well-
suited to this goal, because it relies on altruism, rather than self-interest.128
Copyright assumes that authors invest in the production of works of
authorship in order to benefit themselves.1 29  By contrast, charity law
assumes that donors invest in the production of works of authorship in order
to benefit the public.3 o Charity law is likely to increase public welfare
because it subsidizes donations intended to increase public welfare.' 3 '
But there are additional reasons to consider reducing the scope and
duration of copyright and to consider relying on charity rather than copyright
to increase investment in works of authorship. Historically, transaction costs
made it difficult for donors to determine which marginal authors to
subsidize.1 32 Donors did not know which authors to subsidize, and did not
have a convenient way to make contributions. 3 3  Moreover, charity law
created incentives for them to donate to charities rather than individual
authors.1 34
Accordingly, donors contributed to charitable organizations, which
solved transaction costs by developing expertise in identifying which artists
124. See Bell, supra note 23, at 261, 264, 277-78; Frye, supra note 38, at 166-
68.
125. See Frye, supra note 38, at 166-68.
126. See Bell, supra note 23, at 261, 264, 277-78; Frye, supra note 38, at 166-
68, 182.
127. See Bell, supra note 23, at 261, 264, 277-78; Frye, supra note 38, at 166-
68, 182.
128. Frye, supra note 38, at 168.
129. See Bell, supra note 23, at 238, 242.
130. See Frye, supra note 38, at 161.
131. See id. at 160-62.
132. Id. at 157, 182.
133. See id. at 157.
134. Id. at 187-88.
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to subsidize and provided charitable contribution deductions., 35 But authors
and donors also developed legal workarounds, which enabled them to steer
charitable contributions to particular authors.1 36 And more recently, social
entrepreneurs have developed methods of using technology to solve charity
failures, and more efficiently encourage and enable marginal donors to make
donations in support of the production of works of authorship.13 7
1. Fiscal Sponsorship
For example, in the arts sector, donors and authors use fiscal
sponsorship in order to enable donors to both support particular authors or
particular projects and claim a charitable contribution deduction. 13 8  In
theory, charity law only permits taxpayers to claim charitable contribution
deductions for donations to charitable organizations that are exempt under 26
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).1 39 As a consequence, it does not allow taxpayers to claim
charitable contribution deductions for donations to individuals, which are
generally treated as gifts for income tax purposes.140
Donors and authors use fiscal sponsors in order to circumvent that
restriction. 14 1 A fiscal sponsor is a charitable organization that receives
charitable contributions from donors on behalf of particular authors.1 42 The
donor claims a charitable contribution deduction, the charity claims a fee,
and the author receives the balance of the donation. 143 Essentially, fiscal
sponsorship is a legal fiction that enables donors to claim a deduction for a
contribution to an individual.'" In theory, the charity receiving the
contribution is not obligated to pass the donation on to its intended private
recipient, and makes an independent determination that providing funds to
that author is consistent with its charitable purpose.14 5 But this obligation is
observed almost entirely in the breach, and charities acting as fiscal sponsors
135. See Frye, supra note 38, at 183.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 159, 190-92.
138. Id. at 187-88.
139. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012); PUB. COuNS. L. CTR., FISCAL SPONSORSHIP:
AN ALTERNATIVE TO FORMING A NONPROFIT 501(c)(3) CORPORATION 2 (2009), available at
http://www.publiccounsel.org/tools/assets/files/0483.pdf
140. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
141. PUB. CouNs. L. CTR., supra note 139, at 2; see also I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
142. See PUB. CouNs. L. CTR., supra note 139, at 2.; loby's Fiscal Sponsorship
Service, IOBY, https://www.ioby.org/fiscal-sponsorship (last visited Aug. 27, 2015).
143. Frye, supra note 38, at 187.
144. See id.
145. See PUB. CouNs. L. CTR., supra note 139, at 2; loby's Fiscal Sponsorship
Service, supra note 142.
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effectively function as conduits for donations that would otherwise be
ineligible for charitable contribution deductions.1 4 6
Interestingly, the IRS has tolerated the practice of fiscal sponsorship,
despite its apparent inconsistency with federal tax law.14 7  The best
explanation for the IRS's forbearance is probably that while fiscal
sponsorship may strain the letter of the law, it is generally consistent with its
purpose.1 48  Charities generally exercise at least some oversight over the
authors and projects they agree to sponsor, and sponsoring works of
authorship is generally a charitable activity.
In addition, fiscal sponsorship may help solve market failures
associated with works of authorship by reducing transaction costs associated
with determining which works to sponsor.1 49  It is costly for charities to
determine which authors and projects to sponsor, and it is difficult for
charities to solicit funds to sponsor works of authorship in general, rather
than specific projects. 50 Fiscal sponsorship reduces these transaction costs
by enabling donors and authors to make a direct connection, without a
mediating charity.' 5
In any case, the prevalence of fiscal sponsorship suggests that charity
law provides a salient incentive to at least some marginal donors. In the
absence of fiscal sponsorship, donors could still make gifts to individual
authors.1 52  The primary purpose of fiscal sponsorship is to ensure that
donors can claim a charitable contribution deduction for their donation. 5 3
Presumably, the ability to claim a charitable contribution deduction
motivates at least some marginal donors to give.
However, fiscal sponsorship has a critical weakness, which is a
function of its reliance on leveraging the charitable contribution deduction in
the service of reducing transaction costs.' 54  Because fiscal sponsorship
depends on the salience of the charitable contribution deduction, it cannot
provide a salient incentive to marginal donors who cannot claim the
146. See Frye, supra note 38, at 187; loby's Fiscal Sponsorship Service, supra
note 142.
147. See loby 's Fiscal Sponsorship Service, supra note 142.
148. See Frye, supra note 38, at 187-88; loby's Fiscal Sponsorship Service,
supra note 142.
149. Ioby's Fiscal Sponsorship Service, supra note 142.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See, e.g., Faulhaber, supra note 101, at 1320.
153. Id. at 1318-19. In addition, fiscal sponsorships enable certain private
foundations that are only permitted to make grants to public charities to effectively make
grants to individual authors. See loby's Fiscal Sponsorship Service, supra note 142.
154. See PUB. CouNs. L. CTR., supra note 139, at 3.
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deduction.155 As a result, the overwhelming majority of taxpayers should be
indifferent to fiscal sponsorship.
2. Crowdfunding
As I have previously shown, charity law is vulnerable to charity
failures, or inefficiencies in its ability to solve market and government
failures, caused by the inability of the charitable contribution deduction to
provide a salient incentive to the overwhelming majority of taxpayers who
do not itemize their deductions.156 I argue that the remarkable success of
crowdfunding-which already provides more arts funding than the federal
government-is a function of its ability to solve some of those charity
failures. First, crowdfunding reduces transaction costs associated with
soliciting donations, by providing authors with low-cost platforms that make
it easy to leverage the network effects of social media.1 57  Second,
crowdfunding reduces transactions associated with making donations, by
reducing search and information costs on donors.158 And third, reward-based
crowdfunding enables authors to provide salient incentives to marginal
donors who cannot claim charitable contribution deductions. 159
Essentially, crowdfunding is a way of using technology to solve
charity failures. 160 Of course, crowdfunding works of authorship is generally
not charitable in the strictest sense, as most donations are not charitable
contributions under the Internal Revenue Code.161 However, it is often
charitable in the broader sense that the contributions include a gratuitous
element and are intended to support the creation of works of authorship that
will increase public welfare.1 62
155. Fiscal Sponsorship for Nonprofits, NAT'L COUNCIL OF NONPROFITS,
https://www.councilofnonprofits.org/tools-resources/fiscal-sponsorship-nonprofits (last visited
Aug. 27, 2015).
156. Frye, supra note 38, at 171, 173.
157. Id. at 178-79.
158. Id. at 182.
159. Id. at 183, 190-91.
160. Id. at 178.
161. See Frye, supra note 38, at 160-61, 180-81.
162. Id. at 179-81.
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3. Open-Source
The open-source movement is another way of using technology to
solve charity failures. 163 Open-source is a development model that provides
universal access to works of authorship by providing a free license to use and
distribute the work, and by requiring that authors of derivative works also
provide a free license to use and distribute the derivative work.'6 The open-
source movement initially focused on computer software, enabling authors to
provide a free license for the public to use, distribute, and improve source
code.16 5 But the open-source movement has subsequently expanded to other
forms of authorship and innovation, and has inspired many related open
licensing schemes, like Creative Commons.1 66  Open-source is especially
prevalent in various scholarly fields, and there is an emerging norm among
scholars in many fields to provide open access to all of their papers and
research. 167
Essentially, open-source is a way of using the Internet and social
media to reduce transaction costs associated with copyright and other forms
of intellectual property.1 68 Historically, works of authorship were distributed
by commercial intermediaries, which reduced transaction costs by enabling
authors to effectively distribute works of authorship to the public.'6 9  The
Internet and social media have rendered many of those commercial
distributors largely irrelevant by enabling authors to effectively distribute
certain categories of works of authorship to the public at no cost. 70 Many
authors do not need to recover the fixed and opportunity costs of
authorship.' 7' For example, most scholars produce works of authorship as a
function of their employment.1 72 As a consequence, open-source is attractive
163. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: THE NATURE AND FUTURE OF
CREATIVITY 46 (2004).
164. See BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 90, at 17-18; LESSIG, supra note 163,
at 46; About the Licenses, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/licenses (last
visited Aug. 27, 2015).
165. See LESSIG, supra note 163, at 46; About the Licenses, supra note 164.
166. See About the Licenses, supra note 164.
167. See id. But see ERIC S. RAYMOND, THE CATHEDRAL AND THE BAZAAR:
MUSINGS ON LINUX AND OPEN SOURCE BY AN ACCIDENTAL REVOLUTIONARY 128 (rev. ed.
2001).
168. See LESSIG, supra note 163, at 46-47; supra Part V.A.
169. See Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 47, at 266-67 n.3 1.
170. See id; Eric Schlacter, The Intellectual Property Renaissance in
Cyberspace: Why Copyright Law Could Be Unimportant on the Internet, 12 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 15, 22 (1997).
171. See Schlacter, supra note 170, at 22.
172. LESSIG, supra note 163, at 46-47.
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to scholars, as it enables them to distribute their works of authorship at no
cost to the consumer, thereby increasing its distribution in the academic gift
economy. 173
VI. CONCLUSION
Copyright and charity law are similar because they both use indirect
subsidies to solve market and government failures in public goods caused by
free riding. Copyright solves market and government failures in works of
authorship, a particular category of public goods. Charity law solves market
and government failures in charitable goods, which include a broad range of
public and quasi-public goods, including works of authorship. Copyright
solves market failures in works of authorship by making them partially
excludable and thereby limiting free riding, and solves government failures
by reducing information costs associated with determining which works to
subsidize. Charity law solves market failures in charitable goods by making
certain charitable contributions deductible, and thereby compensating for
free riding, and solves government failures by reducing transaction costs
associated with majoritarian politics. In other words, copyright and charity
law are complements that use different means to pursue similar goals.
Notably, copyright and charity law are associated with different
transaction costs. Copyright efficiently reduces ex ante transaction costs by
delegating the decision whether to invest in works of authorship onto
marginal authors and by forcing them to internalize the risk associated with
investing in works of authorship. But copyright increases ex post transaction
costs by making it more difficult and expensive for consumers to use works
of authorship. Moreover, copyright encourages rent-seeking by the copyright
owners of works with substantial social value.
By contrast, charity law moderately reduces both ex ante and ex post
transaction costs by delegating the decision whether to invest in charitable
goods onto marginal donors, and by providing a relatively modest and
contingent subsidy. While copyright reduces ex ante transaction costs
associated with investment charity law more efficiently than charity law,
copyright increases ex post transaction costs, and charity law does not. In
addition, new technologies like crowdfunding and the open-source
movement enable authors and donors to solve certain market and
government failures previously addressed by copyright and charity law
without the need for the indirect subsidies that copyright and charity law use
to provide incentive to marginal authors and donors.
173. Id.; see Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 47, at 266-67.
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As a consequence, we should consider reducing the scope of
copyright protection to focus on its ability to efficiently reduce ex ante
transaction costs by enabling authors to recover their fixed and opportunities
costs, and use charity law and related technologies to reduce ex post
transaction costs associated with investment in the creation of works of
authorship.
